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that operating inflexibility is an economically important source of risk.
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Understanding what are the underlying sources of risk that drive the cross-sectional
and time-series variation in ﬁrms’ cost of capital is of fundamental interest in ﬁ-
nancial economics. Previous work, including recent studies by Pástor, Sinha, and
Swaminathan (2008) and Chava and Purnanandam (2009) which highlight the im-
portance of using ex-ante measures of the cost of capital, shed light on this question.
However, very little is known about how the cost of capital may be aﬀected by the
liquidity of a ﬁrm’s physical assets. Yet, asset liquidity directly aﬀects a ﬁrm’s ability
to redeploy its real assets to alternative uses and thus its ﬂexibility in responding to
a changing business environment. For example, Diamond and Rajan (2009) argue
that during the recent ﬁnancial crisis ﬁrms may have been unwilling to sell assets at
the prevailing ﬁre-sale prices.
The importance of the constraints that illiquid asset markets impose on a ﬁrm’s
ability to restructure its operations are illustrated in a recent article in the Wall
Street Journal.1 In early June 2009 Quest Communications was soliciting bids for its
long-distance business, with the objectives of exiting an unproﬁtable business and
raising cash to pay down some of its debt. Naturally, the potential buyers for this
highly industry-speciﬁc asset were other telecom ﬁrms (e.g., Level 3 Communications,
XO Communications, and TW Telecom). However, the potential bids were coming
at a 50% discount from the target price set by Quest. At that time, Quest faced the
choice of calling oﬀ the auction or accepting a signiﬁcant discount.
In this paper we examine whether more liquid asset markets reduce a ﬁrm’s cost
of capital by increasing its operating ﬂexibility. Our study is motivated by recent
studies in both corporate ﬁnance and asset pricing. The corporate ﬁnance literature
emphasizes the signiﬁcant frictions ﬁrms face in redeploying their real assets to their
best alternative use. The problem is that, because assets are often industry or ﬁrm
speciﬁc, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a suitable buyer (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). This
issue is the focus of a recent study by Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2009) who
show that, when assets are industry speciﬁc but transferable to other ﬁrms in the
industry, solvent ﬁrms can provide liquidity to distressed ﬁrms by buying their assets
1See Amol Sharma, “Quest’s Long-Distance Arm Draws Bids Below Targets”, Wall Street Jour-
nal, dateMonth6Day5Year2009June 5, 2009.
1even in the absence of operational synergies. Furthermore, other studies have shown
that asset sales in illiquid markets are associated with a signiﬁcant price discount
(Pulvino (1998), Ramey and Shapiro (2001), and Gavazza (2008)). This implies that
t h ec o s taﬁrm faces in reversing an investment and its ability to raise cash in an
asset sale when distressed depend on the liquidity of the market for its real assets.
In sum, this literature suggests that asset liquidity is a main determinant of a ﬁrm’s
operating ﬂexibility and that as a result asset liquidity should aﬀect a ﬁrm’s cost of
capital ex-ante.
In asset pricing, a growing theoretical literature directly links a ﬁrm’s cost of
reversing its real investment to its cost of capital (e.g., Kogan (2004), Gomes, Kogan,
and Zhang (2003), Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004), Zhang (2005), and
Cooper (2006)). The argument is that ﬁrms with signiﬁcant costs of reversing their
real investments will be unable to scale down their operations during times of low
demand for their products. As a result, they will be unable to cut their ﬁxed costs
and will remain burdened with unproductive capital. This, in turn, increases the
covariance of a ﬁrm’s performance with macroeconomic conditions, especially during
economic downturns, and thus it leads investors to require higher returns for the
capital they provide.
For the purposes of our study it is important that we measure asset liquidity for
ﬁrms in a broad number of industries and over a long period of time. Throughout the
paper, we use three diﬀerent measures of asset liquidity: the number of industry rivals
with access to debt markets, the average leverage net of cash of industry rivals, and
the value of M&A activity in a ﬁrm’s industry. The ﬁrst two measures capture the
presence of potential buyers from within the industry and are motivated by Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) and recently by Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2009). The
intuition behind these measures is that a ﬁrm’s assets are more valuable to other
ﬁrms in the industry, which are better able to redeploy them to alternative uses.
As a result, industry insiders with ﬁnancial slack are the most likely buyers of the
assets. The third measure follows Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling (2002), who
argue that a high volume of M&A activity in an industry is evidence of high asset
liquidity because price discounts are smaller in more active resale markets.
We measure a ﬁrm’s expected return using two alternative methods. The primary
2measure we use in our analyses is the implied cost of capital (ICC), which Pástor,
Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008) show is a good proxy for a stock’s conditional ex-
pected return under plausible conditions. An advantage of using ICC is that it does
not rely on noisy realized returns or on speciﬁc asset pricing models. Speciﬁcally, El-
ton (1999) forcefully argues against using realized returns in asset pricing tests, and
Fama and French (1997) show that measures based on standard models are impre-
cise. Moreover, unlike tests based on returns, the ICC detects a positive risk-return
tradeoﬀ (Pástor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008)) and a positive relation between
distress risk and expected returns (Chava and Purnanandam (2009)).2 For robust-
ness, in our main tests we also measure expected returns using Fama and French’s
(1993) three-factor model (FFCC).
Using a large-scale dataset containing ﬁrms in 304 diﬀerent three-digit SIC indus-
tries during the period 1984-2006, we show that asset liquidity is a major determinant
of a ﬁrm’s operating ﬂexibility, and that it has an economically signiﬁcant impact on
a ﬁrm’s cost of capital. In our initial univariate tests using both the implied cost of
capital and the Fama-French cost of capital as well as alternative measures of asset
liquidity, we ﬁnd an asset-liquidity discount, that is, the cost of capital is lower for
ﬁrms in the highest versus the lowest asset-liquidity quintiles. Our estimates range
from 2.72 to 6.52 percentage points lower depending on the measure of asset liquid-
ity. Moreover, consistent with the theoretical argument that operating inﬂexibility
causes time-varying equity risk, in time-series tests we ﬁnd that the asset-liquidity
discount is strongly counter-cyclical. Thus, our initial evidence shows that there
is an asset-liquidity discount which is likely to be driven by costly reversibility of
investment.
Consequently, in ﬁrm-level tests we further examine the relation between asset
liquidity and the cost of capital by exploiting the rich panel structure of our data.
Our cross-sectional multivariate tests show that ﬁrms with higher asset liquidity have
a lower implied cost of capital and a lower Fama-French cost of capital than ﬁrms
with lower asset liquidity. Our within-industry time-series tests show that during
periods of high asset liquidity in the industry a ﬁrm’s implied cost of capital is lower
2While the ICC uses analysts’ forecasts, Campello, Chen, and Zhang (2009) derive a measure
of ex-ante expected returns based on bond yields, but its empirical execution is constrained by the
limited availability of bond yield data.
3than it is during periods of low asset liquidity. These tests imply that a one-standard
deviation increase in asset liquidity across ﬁrms decreases the implied cost of capital
by 1.4 to 1.9 percentage points and a similar increase in an industry’s asset liquidity
over time decreases the implied cost of capital by 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points.
Our measure of asset liquidity based on M&A activity allows us to further distin-
guish between inside asset liquidity, the value of M&A activity involving acquirers
that operate within the industry, and outside asset liquidity, the value of M&A ac-
tivity involving acquirers that operate outside the industry. As argued by Shleifer
and Vishny (1992), buyers from inside the industry can better redeploy the asset to a
productive use and are willing to pay higher prices. In contrast, buyers from outside
the industry are willing to pay lower prices due to a lack of synergies and of experi-
ence in operating the asset. Suggesting that inside buyers provide more liquidity in
asset markets than outside buyers, we ﬁnd that inside liquidity reduces ﬁrms’ implied
cost of capital by more than outside liquidity. These ﬁndings are consistent with the
recent results for mergers in Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2009), who show
that when industry-level asset speciﬁcity is high ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms are often
able to sell their assets to more ﬁnancially ﬂexible ﬁrms in their industries instead
of selling them to industry outsiders.
We also explore which competitive factors aﬀect the importance of asset liquidity
in explaining ﬁrms’ cost of capital. We ﬁrst study the role of the competitive risk
a ﬁrm faces in product markets. Asset liquidity should be more valuable for ﬁrms
in more competitive industries, where competition is ﬁercer due to lower barriers to
entry. It should also be more valuable for the smallest ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r y ,s i n c e
these ﬁrms are more exposed to competitive threats from larger rivals and have a
higher likelihood of exit in industry restructurings. Supporting these predictions,
we ﬁnd that asset liquidity decreases the implied cost of capital mostly for ﬁrms in
competitive industries and for ﬁrms with smaller market shares.
Our arguments suggest that asset liquidity is valuable because it allows ﬁrms
to scale down their operations and to raise cash with asset sales. This suggests
that the eﬀect of asset liquidity on the cost of capital should depend on a ﬁrm’s
access to external ﬁnancing, its ﬁnancial situation, its investment opportunities, and
its economic environment. Supporting this view, we ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect of
4asset liquidity on the implied cost of capital is stronger for ﬁrms with no debt ratings,
with higher probability of default, with lower market-to-book value of assets, and for
those operating during industry downturns.
In further robustness tests we show that the eﬀect of asset liquidity on the implied
cost of capital holds in pure cross-sectional tests, as well as in cross-sectional and
time-series tests controlling for the industry’s valuation. This suggests that our
ﬁndings are not biased by a correlation between our measures of asset liquidity and
changes in industry valuation or the supply of capital. Moreover, our main results
hold in industry-level tests, they are robust to measuring expected returns using the
unlevered implied cost of capital, and are not driven by biases in analysts’ forecasts.
They also hold if we measure asset liquidity using the average acquisition premium
in the industry, when we use segment-weighted measures of asset liquidity, and if we
control for stock liquidity or cash holdings.
Our paper is closely related to the literature which suggests that a ﬁrm’s abil-
ity to sell assets enhances its operating and ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. Maksimovic and
Phillips (1998) show that asset sales are at the core of ﬁrms’ restructuring processes,
and Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) show that asset liquidity determines
ﬁrms’ ability to restructure. Moreover, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) ﬁnd that
sellers of assets are usually poor performers and Weiss and Wruck (1998) show that
asset liquidity helps managers maneuver in ﬁnancial distress.3 Similarly, Almeida,
Campello, and Hackbarth (2009) show that when assets are transferrable within the
industry inside-industry buyers purchase distressed assets purely due to liquidity
reasons. Last, Benmelech and Bergman (2009) ﬁnd that debt tranches of airlines
secured with more redeployable collateral have higher credit ratings and lower credit
spreads. We add to this literature by showing that the ﬂexibility provided by asset
liquidity signiﬁcantly reduces a ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our main hypothesis and
related empirical predictions. Section 3 describes our data and variables. Section 4
reports the main empirical results. Section 5 presents additional robustness tests.
Section 6 concludes.
3In addition, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002) ﬁnd that LA Gear’s ability to liquidate
working capital to fund operations allowed the ﬁrm to implement various business strategies and
delay distress.
5II. The Value of Asset Liquidity and the Cost of Capital
Our framework is based on the recent corporate ﬁnance and asset pricing literatures
that emphasize the signiﬁcant frictions ﬁrms face in redeploying their real assets to
their best alternative uses, and in recovering the undepreciated value of their original
investments. The central idea is that the liquidity of the market for a ﬁrm’s real
assets determines the diﬀerence between the market price for those assets and their
fundamental value, and thus it determines the ﬁrm’s cost of unwinding its capital
stock as well as its ability to raise cash with asset sales. Highlighting the role of asset
liquidity, Pulvino (1998) and Ramey and Shapiro (2001) document signiﬁcant price
discounts for asset sales in illiquid markets.
The corporate ﬁnance literature suggests that asset liquidity enhances a ﬁrm’s
operating ﬂexibility and thus it may reduce the cost of capital by facilitating ﬁrms’
restructuring processes (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips (1998), and Schlingemann,
Stulz, and Walkling (2002)), which is especially valuable to ﬁrms facing economic ad-
versity (e.g., Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995), Weiss and Wruck (1998), and Almeida,
Campello, and Hackbarth (2009)). Moreover, the asset pricing literature (e.g., Ko-
gan (2004), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino
(2004), Zhang (2005), and Cooper (2006)) also suggests that ﬁrms facing illiquid
asset markets are unable to sell unproductive assets to cut their ﬁxed costs in times
of low demand, and thus the higher operating risk leads investors to require higher
returns for the capital they provide. These arguments lead to our central hypothesis:
Main Hypothesis: Asset liquidity reduces ﬁrms’ cost of capital by increasing their
operating ﬂexibility.
To guide our analysis we develop several testable predictions that follow from our
main hypothesis. First, note that our hypothesis has two broad implications that
should hold at the aggregate level.S p e c i ﬁcally, there should be a negative spread
in cost of capital between the high and low asset-liquidity ﬁrms, that is, an asset-
liquidity discount. Moreover, the growing theoretical literature which directly links
a ﬁrm’s operating inﬂexibility to its cost of capital provides a rationale for counter-
cyclical time-series variation in equity risk. The argument is that asset liquidity
is more valuable when economic conditions worsen and ﬁrms are more likely to
6need to sell assets, either to reduce ﬁxed costs and thus operating risk or to raise
the cash necessary to fund operations and avoid default. This suggests that the
aggregate asset-liquidity discount should be counter-cyclical. These implications are
summarized below:
Prediction 1: At the aggregate level, there should be an asset-liquidity discount in the
cost of capital that exhibits a counter-cyclical time-series variation.
We now derive several predictions that can be tested in multivariate analyses at
the ﬁrm level by exploiting the rich panel structure of our data. The ﬁrst predic-
tion relates asset liquidity to the cost of capital and follows directly from our main
hypothesis:
Prediction 2: Firms with a more liquid market for their assets should have a lower
cost of capital.
As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), inside buyers (who operate in the same
industry as the target) can better redeploy the asset to a productive use and thus are
willing to pay higher prices. In contrast, outside buyers (who do not operate in the
industry) are willing to pay lower prices due to reduced synergies and inexperience in
operating the asset. Supporting this view, Pulvino (1998) and Ramey and Shapiro
(2001) show that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms that are forced to sell their assets to
industry outsiders obtain prices that are substantially below the prices they would
have obtained had they been able to sell them to industry insiders. This suggests
that the presence of inside buyers provides more liquidity in the market for corporate
assets than does the presence of outside buyers, and thus should have a stronger eﬀect
on ﬁrms’ cost of capital. This intuition leads to our third prediction:
Prediction 3: Inside asset liquidity should decrease a ﬁrm’s cost of capital more than
outside asset liquidity.
Our remaining predictions deal with the question of what may drive the cross-
sectional v a r i a t i o ni nt h es t r e n g t ho ft h ee ﬀect of asset liquidity on the cost of
capital. We ﬁrst focus on the roles of competition in product markets and a ﬁrm’s
competitive position. Previous research in industrial organization shows that product
market competition is more intense in more competitive industries. At the one
extreme, in highly concentrated markets barriers to entry entrench incumbent ﬁrms
7in their market positions. At the other extreme, the free entry of ﬁrms in competitive
industries makes markets highly contestable, and ﬁrms that fail to quickly adapt to
a changing environment are drawn out of business. Consistent with this view, Hou
and Robinson (2006) empirically show that the stocks of ﬁrms operating in more
competitive industries earn higher average returns. This logic suggests that the
operating ﬂexibility provided by a more liquid market for assets is more valuable to
ﬁrms in more competitive industries because they face higher competitive risk.
In addition, a ﬁrm’s relative position in the industry is also an important deter-
minant of its competitive risk. Unlike the largest ﬁrms in the industry (the “industry
leaders”), who have well-established industry positions, the smallest ﬁr m si na ni n -
dustry (the “followers”) have a higher competitive risk due to their weaker industry
positions in terms of market share, customer and supplier loyalty, and ability to en-
dure economic hardship. Moreover, previous work shows that small ﬁrms are more
exposed to competitive threats from larger rivals, and that they account for the ma-
jority of exits in industry restructurings.4 Thus, higher asset liquidity should also be
more valuable for the smallest ﬁr m si nt h ei n d u s t r y .T h ea r g u m e n t sa b o v eg i v er i s e
to the following two predictions:
Prediction 4.a: Asset liquidity should reduce the cost of capital more for ﬁrms in
more competitive industries.
Prediction 4.b: Asset liquidity should reduce the cost of capital more for the smallest
ﬁrms in each industry.
Our remaining predictions focus on the roles of a ﬁrm’s access to ﬁnancing, its
ﬁnancial situation, and its business environment. First, asset liquidity should be
more valuable for ﬁrms with less access to external capital and for ﬁrms that are
closer to ﬁnancial distress. The reason is that such ﬁrms may be forced to raise
cash with asset sales, for example, to fund new investment in the case of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms or to fund existing operations and avert bankruptcy in the case of
distressed ﬁrms. Supporting the view, Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2009) report
that during the recent ﬁnancial crisis ﬁnancially constrained ﬁr m sh a v ee n g a g e di n
signiﬁcantly more asset sales than have unconstrained ﬁrms. Second, as discussed
4Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that one reason smaller stocks are more risky is
because they are associated with higher distress risk (e.g., Chan and Chen (1991)).
8before asset pricing theory suggests that a ﬁrm’s ability to sell its assets is more
valuable in bad times, such as when ﬁrms have low market-to-book ratios or during
industry-wide recessions (e.g., Kogan (2001) and Zhang (2005)). The reason is that
it is in bad times when ﬁrms may want to sell assets to reduce their ﬁxed costs and
operating risk or to raise cash. These predictions are summarized as follows:
Prediction 5.a: Asset liquidity should reduce the cost of capital more for ﬁrms with
less access to capital and for ﬁrms that are closer to default.
Prediction 5.b: Asset liquidity should reduce the cost of capital more for ﬁrms with
lower valuations and for ﬁrms facing negative demand shocks.
III. Data and Variables
A. Data Sources and Sample Selection
Our data come from the Merged CRSP-Compustat Database, the Compustat Seg-
ment Database, the Institutional Broker Estimates System (IBES), the Securities
Data Corporation (SDC), the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED),
and the Census of Manufactures. We start with the Merged CRSP-Compustat Data-
base and exclude companies in the ﬁnancial (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and utilities
(SIC codes 4900 to 4999) industries. We also drop companies not covered in IBES
because we require analyst forecasts data to calculate the implied cost of capital,
as well as observations for which we are unable to compute asset liquidity or our
main control variables. Our ﬁnal sample includes 6,260 ﬁrms operating in 304 dif-
ferent three-digit SIC industries and 33,788 ﬁrm-year observations during the period
1984-2006.5
B. Measures of Asset Liquidity
Previous work on how asset liquidity aﬀects resale values relies on small samples and
on speciﬁc industries where speciﬁc attributes of the assets can be identiﬁed precisely
(e.g., Pulvino (1998), Ramey and Shapiro (2001), and Gavazza (2008)). Given that
we aim to study whether asset liquidity aﬀects ﬁrms’ cost of capital it is important
5We did not impose restrictions on the number of ﬁr m si ne a c ht h r e e - d i g i tS I Ci n d u s t r yf o r
inclusion in our sample. However, our results are robust to excluding ﬁrms in industries with less
than three or ﬁve ﬁrms.
9that we measure asset liquidity for ﬁrms in a broad number of industries and over a
long sample period.
Throughout the paper we use three main measures of asset liquidity. The ﬁrst
two capture the presence of potential future buyers from within the industry and are
motivated by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth
(2009). The intuition behind these measures is that a ﬁrm’s assets are more valuable
to other ﬁrms in the industry, which are better able to redeploy them to alternative
uses. As a result, ﬁnancially-ﬂexible industry insiders are the most likely buyers of
a ﬁrm’s assets in the event the ﬁrm wishes to sell them in the near future. It then
follows that a ﬁrm’s assets are more liquid when there is a larger number of potential
inside-industry buyers with ﬁnancial slack.
Speciﬁcally, our ﬁrst measure of asset liquidity is similar to those used in Benm-
elech and Bergman (2009) and Gavazza (2008) for the airline industry. This measure
is the number of potential buyers for a ﬁrm’s assets, NoPotBuy,d e ﬁned as the num-
ber of rival ﬁrms in the three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings. In a similar
vein, our second measure, denoted MNLPotBuy, directly captures the ﬁnancial slack
of potential buyers, and is deﬁned as minus the average book leverage net of cash of
rival ﬁrms in the three-digit SIC industry, averaged over the last 5 years to minimize
the impact of temporary changes in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial situations. Given the deﬁnition
of these variables, a ﬁrm’s assets are more liquid for higher values of both NoPotBuy
and MNLPotBuy.
Our third measure of asset liquidity follows Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling
(2002) and it captures the historical liquidity of a ﬁrm’s assets using the value of
past M&A activity in the ﬁrm’s industry. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that a
high volume of transactions in an industry is evidence of high liquidity because the
discounts that sellers must oﬀer to attract buyers are smaller in more active resale
markets. Consequently, we obtain the value of all M&A activity involving publicly
traded targets in each three-digit SIC industry and in each year from the Securities
Data Corporation (SDC).6 We include both mergers and acquisitions of assets. Ac-
6We focus on transactions involving publicly traded targets because the Compustat ﬁrms for
which we wish to measure asset liquidity are publicly traded. Moreover, transactions involving
private targets are likely to be reported with noise due to the weaker disclosure requirements for
these transactions.
10quisitions of assets are particularly important as they comprise approximately 75%
of the total deals. If SDC does not report corporate transactions in an industry-year,
we set the value of transactions equal to zero. We then scale the value of transac-
tions in the industry by the total book value of assets in the industry, and further
average this ratio over the past ﬁve years. To compute the value of the assets in each
industry, we sum the assets in the industry reported by single-segment ﬁrms and
the segment level assets reported by multiple-segment ﬁrms in the Compustat Seg-
ment data, breaking up the multiple-segment ﬁrms into their component industries.
Averaging over past years smooths the temporary ups and downs in M&A activity
and allows us to better capture the intrinsic salability of an industry’s assets. The
resulting asset-liquidity measure is denoted TotM&A.7
We further decompose our third measure of asset liquidity to distinguish between
inside buyers of assets — those who operate in the same three-digit SIC industry as
the target — and outside buyers — those who do not currently operate in the industry.
Again we use the Compustat Segment tapes to further reﬁne this calculation. We
classify a purchase as an inside purchase if the buyer has any segments with the
same there-digit SIC code as the assets purchased — checking over each reported SIC
code of the target if the target reports multiple SIC codes. InsM&A is the value of
M&A activity in the industry involving acquirers that operate within the industry,
scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry. OutM&A is the value of M&A
activity in the industry involving acquirers that operate outside the industry, scaled
by the book value of the assets in the industry. Both of these variables are averaged
over the past ﬁve years.
To facilitate the comparison of the eﬀect of NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, TotM&MA,
InsM&A, and OutM&A on the cost of capital, we standardize all original asset liquid-
ity variables by subtracting their sample mean and dividing by their sample standard
deviation. With this transformation all measures of asset liquidity have mean zero
and standard deviation of one. Hence, in regressions of the cost of capital on as-
set liquidity the coeﬃcient of any asset liquidity variable can be interpreted as the
change in the cost of capital for a one-standard-deviation increase in the measure of
7Our analyses based on this and related M&A measures are unaﬀected if we exclude from the
sample ﬁrms that are undergoing M&A activity in a particular year.
11asset liquidity.
C. Measures of Cost of Capital
We construct two diﬀerent measures of a ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital. Our main mea-
sure is the implied cost of capital (ICC) developed by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swami-
nathan (2001) and our second measure, which we use to assess the robustness of the
results based on ICC, is the cost of capital that arises from the three-factor model of
Fama and French (1993). While we report results for both measures, we focus mainly
on the ICC as a proxy for expected returns for several reasons. Its main advantage
is that it does not rely on potentially noisy realized asset returns or on speciﬁc asset
pricing models. Moreover, in a recent study Pástor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008)
show that if both dividend growth and conditional expected returns follow AR(??)
processes, then ICC is a perfect proxy for expected returns. They also show that,
unlike tests based on market returns, those based on ICC can identify a positive
risk-return tradeoﬀ. In addition, Chava and Purnanandam (2009) show that the
ICC detects a positive relation between distress risk and expected returns instead of
the puzzling negative relation that is obtained using realized returns.8 Due to these
attractive features, ex-ante measures of expected returns, such as ICC,a r eu s e di n
various other recent studies of the cost of capital (e.g., Kaplan and Ruback (1995),
Claus and Thomas (2001), Fama and French (2002), Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan
(2003), Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2005), Chen, Petkova, and Zhang (2008), and
Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2009)).
Following Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), the implied cost of capital
is deﬁned as the discount rate that equates the present value of all expected future
cash ﬂows to shareholders to the current stock price. Speciﬁcally, the calculation of





(1 + re)i (1)
where P is the stock price, D is dividends, re is the discount rate, and E(.) is the
8Earlier studies have discussed in some detail the noisy nature of average realized returns in a
number of diﬀerent contexts (see, e.g., Blume and Friend (1973), Sharpe (1978), and Miller and
Scholes (1982)).
12expectation operator. Using equation (1) and assuming clean surplus accounting
(change in book equity equals net income minus dividends), we get the discounted
residual income equity valuation model:




(1 + re)i Pt (2)
where ROE i st h er e t u r no ne q u i t ya n dB is the book value of equity. We then
numerically solve for the implied cost of equity, re , from equation (2) using the
current stock price, current book value of equity, and forecasts of future ROE and
future book value of equity.
To implement the method, we require forecasts of future earnings and equity
values. As in Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), we forecast earnings explicitly
for the next three years using the analysts’ forecasts of EPS and EPS growth which
we obtain from IBES. We forecast earnings beyond year 3 implicitly by assuming
that the ROE at period t+3 mean reverts to the industry median ROE by period
t+T, and estimate a terminal value as the present value of period T residual income
as a perpetuity. We set T equal to 12 years. The forecasts are obtained through
simple linear interpolation between ROE at period t+3 and the industry median
ROE at time t. The industry median ROE is a moving median of the past ten year
ROEsf r o ma l lﬁrms in the same 48 Fama and French industry. Last, by assuming
a clean-surplus accounting system and a constant dividend payout ratio, we forecast
the future book value of equity using the forecasted future earnings. We refer the
reader to Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) for more detail on the calculation
of ICC.
We follow recent research in ﬁnance (e.g., Pástor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008)
and Chava and Purnanandam (2009)) and calculate the ICC using the approach in
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), but other approaches are also used in
the literature. These approaches are also consistent with the discounted dividend
valuation model, and also obtain the ICC a st h ed i s c o u n tr a t et h a te q u a t e st h e
current stock price to the present value of expected future cash ﬂows derived from
analyst forecasts. However, they diﬀer in how they use the analyst forecast data (e.g.,
residual income or abnormal earnings) and in their assumptions (e.g., on growth
13rates and forecasting horizons). Nevertheless, the various implementations give rise
to measures of the implied cost of capital that are highly correlated. Moreover,
previous work shows that the results of empirical tests based on alternative measures
or indices that aggregate them are qualitatively similar (e.g., Hail and Leuz (2009)).
While the ICC has its merits as noted above, some recent papers (e.g., Easton
and Monahan (2005)) have raised the concern that analysts make biased earnings
forecasts. In Section 5 we show that biases in analysts’ forecasts do not drive the
results in our tests based on the ICC. In addition, we assess the robustness of our
results using the Fama-French Cost of Capital (FFCC) as an alternative measure
of expected returns. This measure derives from the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model and thus it does not rely on analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Speciﬁcally, we calculate the FFCC a sal i n e a rp r o j e c t i o no fr e t u r n sb a s e do nt h e
market, size, and value factors which we obtain from Kenneth French’s website. To
estimate the factor loadings, for each stock j in year t (between 1984 and 2006), we
estimate the following time-series regression using monthly data from year t-4 to t
(we require a minimum of 36 months of data):
rj − rf = αj + β
MKT




j SMB+ εj, (3)
where the (rj —r f ) is the monthly return on stock j minus the risk-free rate, rM
—r f denotes the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate, HML
is the return diﬀerence between high and low book-to-market stocks, and SMB is
the return diﬀerence between small and large capitalization stocks (month and year
subscripts omitted for brevity). We then construct the Fama-French cost of capital
of ﬁrm j in year t as follows:
FFCC j,t = rf + ˆ β
MKT
j,t (rM − rf)+ˆ β
HML
j,t HML+ ˆ β
SMB
j,t SMB, (4)
where (rM − rf), HML,a n dSMBare the average annualized returns of the
Fama-French factors calculated over the period 1926-2008 and the ˆ β
0
s are the OLS
estimates of theβ
0sfrom equation (3) above using monthly stock price data for the
past three to ﬁve years.
14D. Control Variables
In addition to asset liquidity, in our analyses we include control variables that capture
well-known determinants of a ﬁrm’s cost of capital. LogAssets is the logarithm of
total assets (AT); M/B is the market-to-book assets ratio ((CSHO * PRCC_F +
DLTT + DLC + PSTKL — TXDITC) / AT));D R Pis a ﬁrm’s percentile ranking
based on the yearly distribution of its default risk computed using the distance-to-
default model 9; Blev is book leverage ((DLTT + DLC) / AT); ROE is return on
equity (NI / (AT — DLTT — DLC)); VolRoe is the standard deviation of ROE over the
past ﬁve years; FA/TA is ﬁxed assets (PPENT) scaled by total assets (AT); R&DExp
is R&D expenditures (XRD) scaled by sales (SALE); LogAge is the logarithm of one
plus the number of years since the company was ﬁr s tl i s t e di nC R S P ;DivPay equals
one if the ﬁrm pays dividends (DVC is positive) and zero otherwise; SalGrow is the
annual change in the logarithm of sales (SALE); LogInvPrice is the logarithm of one
divided by the stock price as of the estimation date of ICC;a n dRetPM is the stock
return over the past month.
E. Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the variables we use in our analyses. With the
exception of FFCC, the statistics are calculated on the sample of ﬁrms we use in our
main tests based on ICC. We calculate the summary statistics for FFCC using the
larger sample of ﬁrms for which we are able to calculate it and have non-missing values
o nt h et e s ta n dc o n t r o lv a r i a b l e s . T h em e a na n dm e d i a nICC for the ﬁrms in our
sample is close to 10%, with a standard deviation of 5.7%. For FFCC,t h em e a na n d
median are about 14%, with a standard deviation of 9.1%.10 All standardized asset
liquidity variables (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, TotM&MA, InsM&A, and OutM&A)
have by construction mean zero and standard deviation of one. Using the original
(non standardized) asset liquidity variables, the mean value of NoPotBuy is 13.4
ﬁrms, the mean value of MNLPotBuy is -0.068, and the mean value of TotM&A
9We rely on the Merton distance to default model, which is based on Merton’s (1974) bond pricing
model. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the likelihood of default using the simple approach suggested by
Bharath and Shumway (2008).
10The summary statistics for FFCC are similar if we focus on the smaller sample for which we
can calculate ICC.
15is 4.2%. We split TotM&A into inside liquidity (InsM&A) and outside liquidity
(OutM&A), which each roughly account for half of the total asset liquidity in the
industry. Since we focus on the ﬁrms with analyst-forecast data, the ﬁrms in our
sample have average book assets of $580 million and thus are larger than those in the
Compustat universe. Moreover, although not tabulated, our asset liquidity measures
exhibit low correlation with the control variables.
We further inspect the sources of variation in our asset liquidity measures by
estimating a regression of each measure on three-digit SIC industry dummies. This
approach allows us to decompose the total variation in each asset liquidity variable
into the variation due to time-invariant diﬀerences across industries and within-
industry time-series variation. We ﬁnd that 76.5% of the total variation in NoPotBuy
is across industries and 23.5% is time-series variation; 78.2% of the total variation in
MNLPotBuy is across industries and 21.8% is time-series variation; and 40.4% of the
total variation in TotM&A is across industries while 59.6% is time-series variation.
Hence, industry asset liquidity measures exhibit substantial variation both in the
cross section and in the time series. We use both of these sources of variation to
identify our results in the subsequent sections.
IV. Main Empirical Results
A. The Aggregate Asset-Liquidity Discount and its Business-Cycle
Variation
Our hypothesis suggests that ﬁrms with more liquid markets for their real assets
should have a lower cost of capital. In Table 2 we start our investigation of this
issue by relating our three alternative measures of asset liquidity to a ﬁrm’s cost of
capital using a univariate approach. For this purpose, in each year we sort ﬁrms into
quintiles according to the asset liquidity of their industries, where Q1 denotes the low
and Q5 denotes the high asset-liquidity quintiles. We then calculate the average asset
liquidity and the average cost of capital for each quintile across all years. The last two
columns report the diﬀerence in asset liquidity and cost of capital between the highest
and lowest asset-liquidity quintiles, and the corresponding p-value, respectively.
In Panels A, B, and C we measure a ﬁrm’s expected return using the implied cost
16of capital (ICC) and asset liquidity using NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy,a n dTotM&A,
respectively. For all three measures of asset liquidity, we observe a monotonically
decreasing pattern in the implied cost of capital as we move from the lowest asset-
liquidity quintile to the highest asset-liquidity quintile. This relation is economically
signiﬁcant: Using the equal-weighted portfolios, the negative spread in the cost of
capital between asset-liquidity quintiles 5 and 1 is 4.29 percentage points per year
when asset liquidity is measured with NoPotBuy, 5.08 percentage points per year
when it is measured with MNLPotBuy, and 3.96 percentage points when it is mea-
sured with TotM&A. All of these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. The value-weighted portfolios provide similar results. Thus, consistent with
our ﬁrst prediction, the univariate evidence suggests that there is an economically
important asset-liquidity discount in ﬁrms’ cost of capital.
Albeit the evidence in Fama and French (1997) showing that measures of expected
returns based on standard asset pricing models are noisy and imprecise, in Panel D
we repeat our portfolio-sort analysis using the Fama-French cost of capital (FFCC).
The advantages of using FFCC a r et h a ti td o e sn o tr e l yo nt h ee a r n i n g sf o r e c a s t so f
analysts, which have been shown to contain biases, and that we are able to calculate
it for a larger sample of stocks (including those not covered in IBES). For all three
measures of asset liquidity, we ﬁnd a monotonically decreasing pattern in the value-
weighted Fama-French cost of capital as we move from the lowest asset-liquidity
quintile to the highest asset-liquidity quintile. The diﬀerences in the FFCC between
the top and bottom quintiles are both statistically and economically signiﬁcant, but
slightly smaller in magnitude than those reported in Panels A-C which are based on
the ICC. In sum, tests based on the Fama-French cost of capital provide results that
are qualitatively similar to those based on the implied cost of capital and provide
further evidence of an asset-liquidity discount.
Since the literature on operating ﬂexibility provides a rationale for countercyclical
time-series variation in equity risk (e.g., Zhang (2005), and Cooper (2006)), our ﬁrst
prediction also relates the aggregate asset-liquidity discount to the business cycle. If
asset liquidity decreases ﬁrms’ cost of capital because it increases ﬁrms’ operating
ﬂexibility, we should expect the asset-liquidity discount to be larger in periods of
low economic activity. Thus, we also study the time-series variation in the aggregate
17asset-liquidity discount, that is, in the spread between the cost of capital for ﬁrms
in the top and bottom asset-liquidity quintiles.
In Table 3 we report the results of univariate time-series regressions of the aggre-
gate asset-liquidity discount on alternative business-cycle indicators. For both the
implied cost of capital and the Fama-French cost of capital we conduct our tests
using the three diﬀerent measures of the asset-liquidity discount, which are based
on NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy,a n dTotM&A, respectively. Following the asset pricing
literature, we proxy for macroeconomic conditions using GDP growth, capacity uti-
lization, inﬂation rate, T-bill rate, stock market returns, and default spread on corpo-
rate bonds. GDP Growth is the year-over-year growth in the fourth quarter’s GDP;
Capacity Utilization is the utilization rate of installed capacity during the fourth
quarter of the year; Inﬂation is the year-to-year change in the December’s Consumer
Price Index; T-Bill Rate is the average three-month Treasury Bill Rate during the
year; Default Spread is the average diﬀerence between the yield on Moody’s Baa
corporate bonds and the yield of ten-year government bonds during the year; and
Market Return is the annual return on the market index. The regressions with the
asset-liquidity discount based on NoPotBuy use the 22 annual observations in the pe-
riod 1985-2006 and those with discounts based on MNLPotBuy and TotM&A use the
23 annual observations in the period 1984-2006. Our standard errors are corrected
for potential autocorrelation using the Newey-West (1987) adjustment. Note that
because the asset-liquidity spread is negative, a positive coeﬃcient on any indicator
implies that a higher value decreases the magnitude of the asset-liquidity discount.
In Panel A we report the results using the implied cost of capital. The results
are similar for all three measures of the aggregate asset-liquidity discount. They
show that the discount is smaller when market conditions are stronger, that is, when
GDP growth, capacity utilization, inﬂation rate, T-bill rate, and market returns are
higher, and when the default spread is lower. The vast majority of the coeﬃcients
on the business-cycle indicators are statistically signiﬁcant in all of the models we
consider. Moreover, the R2 for each regression, reported in brackets below the t-
statistics, suggests that business-cycle indicators explain a signiﬁcant fraction of the
time-series variation in the asset-liquidity discount.
In Panel B we report the results using the Fama-French cost of capital. Note
18that we exclude the market return speciﬁc a t i o nw h i c ha p p e a r e di nP a n e lA ,a st h e
Fama-French cost of capital has a sensitivity to the market return through market
beta already built into the cost of capital. Once again, the results are similar for all
three measures of the aggregate asset-liquidity discount. Overall, the models show
that the asset-liquidity discount in the Fama-French cost of capital is also smaller
when market conditions are stronger. Thus, both ICC and FFCC give consistent
results.
To summarize, consistent with our ﬁr s tp r e d i c t i o n ,t h e r ei sa na g g r e g a t ea s s e t -
liquidity discount in ﬁrms’ cost of capital that is strongly counter-cyclical. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the view that the operating ﬂexibility provided by a liquid
market for corporate assets is more valuable when economic activity is low and
default risk is high. However, the results may be driven by cross-sectional diﬀerences
in ﬁrm or industry characteristics which can be correlated with both asset liquidity
and the cost of capital. Hence, we now turn to a multivariate analysis that exploits
the panel structure of our data to address these issues.
B. Multivariate Evidence Relating Asset Liquidity and the Cost of
Capital
In this section we test our second prediction of a negative association between asset
liquidity and cost of capital at the ﬁrm level. In our benchmark empirical model
we regress ﬁrms’ cost of capital (ICC or FFCC) on each of the three measures of
asset liquidity (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy,a n dTotM&A) and control for well-known
determinants of the cost of capital including ﬁrm size (LogAssets), the market-to-
book assets ratio (M/B), the percentile ranking of a ﬁrm’s default risk (DRP), ﬁ-
nancial leverage (Blev), proﬁtability (ROE), equity risk (VolROE), asset tangibility
(FA/TA), R&D expenditures (R&DExp), ﬁrm age (LogAge), whether the ﬁrm pays
dividends (DivPay), sales growth (SalGrow), the logarithm of the inverse of price
(LogInvPrice), and the stock return over the last month (RetPM ).
Throughout the paper we estimate our empirical models using the conservative
method of running pooled (panel) OLS regressions and calculating the standard
errors by clustering at the three-digit SIC industry level (using our 304 SIC industry
groupings). This approach speciﬁcally addresses the concern that our asset-liquidity
19measures are constructed at the industry level but the cost of capital and the controls
are ﬁrm-level variables. The worry is that the errors, conditional on the independent
variables, are correlated within three-digit SIC industry groupings. One reason why
this may occur is that industry factors may have a similar eﬀe c to nt h ee q u i t yr i s ko f
all ﬁrms in the industry. Clustered errors assume that observations are independent
across industries, but not necessarily independent within industries. The clustering
method makes weak assumptions about the correlation structure of the error term,
a n dt h u si sl i k e l yt op r o v i d et h em o s t conservative standard errors.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of regressions of the implied cost of cap-
ital (ICC) on the three measures of asset liquidity (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy,a n d
TotM&A)a n dt h ec o n t r o lv a r i a b l e s . N o t e w o r t h y ,i n c l u d i n gLogInvPrice and M/B
in the regression eliminates the concern that our measures of asset liquidity may
be correlated with stock prices and thus mechanically drive the ICC. We include
RetPM to control for the potential sluggishness of analysts forecasts, but the results
are similar if we control for the past three-, six-, and twelve-month stock returns.
We estimate our empirical models using two approaches.
In columns (1),(3), and (5) we run purely cross-sectional regressions based on the
time-series averages of the variables for each ﬁr mo v e rt h es a m p l ep e r i o d .T h u s ,w e
rely solely on the variation in asset liquidity across industries to identify its eﬀect on
a ﬁrm’s cost of capital. For all three measures of asset liquidity, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in
industries with a more liquid market of corporate assets have a lower cost of capital.
These eﬀects are highly statistically signiﬁcant. Since our asset liquidity measures
are standardized, the coeﬃcient estimate on each measure gives the percentage-point
change in the ICC for a one standard-deviation increase in asset liquidity. The cross-
sectional eﬀect is also economically signiﬁcant: A one-standard deviation increase in
asset liquidity decreases the cost of capital by 1.8 percentage points per year if we
measure asset liquidity using NoPotBuy, by 1.9 percentage points if we measure it
using MNLPotBuy, and by 1.4 percentage points if we measure it using TotM&A,
respectively.11
In columns (2), (4), and (6) we run pooled (panel) OLS regressions with three-
11The results are similar in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁc a n c ei fw ee s t i m a t eo u re m p i r i c a l
model using pooled OLS regressions with year dummies or using the Fama-MacBeth approach.
20digit SIC industry dummies and year dummies, and thus use the time-series variation
in the measures of asset liquidity within industries to identify our results. The
advantage of this approach is that it diminishes the concern that omitted industry
factors correlated with both asset liquidity and cost of capital could drive our results.
The cost, however, is that it ignores the large variation in asset liquidity across
industries and thus it diminishes the power of our tests. Nevertheless, we continue
to ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relation between all three measures
of asset liquidity and the cost of capital. These time-series tests imply that a one-
standard deviation increase in an industry’s asset liquidity decreases the cost of
capital for ﬁrms in that industry by about 1.5 percentage points per year when asset
liquidity is measured by NoPotBuy, by 1.1 percentage points when it is measured
by MNLPotBuy, and by 0.5 percentage points when it is measured by TotM&A,
respectively.
In Panel B we report the results of regressions of the Fama-French cost of capi-
tal (FFCC) on the three measures of asset liquidity (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy,a n d
TotM&A) and all the control variables. We omit the coeﬃcients for the control
variables in the interest of space. In columns (1), (3), and (5) we run purely cross-
sectional regressions based on the time-series averages of the variables for each ﬁrm
over the sample period. In these regressions we cluster the standard errors by three-
digit SIC industry. In columns (2), (4), and (6) we run Fama-MacBeth regressions
and calculate our standard errors using the Newey-West procedure with 6 lags. For
both estimation approaches and for all three measures of asset liquidity, we ﬁnd that
ﬁrms in industries with a more liquid market of corporate assets have a lower Fama-
French cost of capital. These eﬀects are highly statistically signiﬁcant, although
smaller in magnitude than those reported in Panel A.12 Depending on the speciﬁca-
tion, a one-standard deviation increase in asset liquidity decreases the cost of capital
for ﬁrms in that industry by about 0.4 to 0.8 percentage points per year.
In sum, we ﬁnd a negative association between ﬁrms’ cost of capital and the liq-
uidity of their assets. This relation holds for tests using the implied cost of capital
12We focus on purely cross-sectional estimation approaches because by construction the FFCC
exhibits a small time-series variation. The reason is that factor loadings for each ﬁrm are based on
5-year rolling window regressions and the average factor returns are constant and common to all
stocks.
21and the Fama-French cost of capital, and for three diﬀerent measures of asset liq-
uidity. This evidence lends support for our central hypothesis that asset liquidity is
associated with increased operating ﬂexibility. Given the evidence in this section and
the previous section, in the remainder of our analyses in the interest of conciseness we
concentrate on the implied cost of capital as the main measure of a ﬁrm’s expected
return and do not report additional results for the Fama-French cost of capital.
C. The Distinction Between Inside and Outside Liquidity
To test our third prediction that inside asset liquidity should decrease ﬁrms’ cost
of capital by more than outside asset liquidity we split our measure of asset liq-
uidity based on M&A activity into two components. These are inside industry asset
liquidity (InsM&A), which captures the value of M&A activity in the industry involv-
ing acquirers that operate within the industry, and outside industry asset liquidity
(OutM&A), which captures the value of M&A activity in the industry involving
acquirers that operate outside the industry. For this purpose, in Table 5 we run
regressions relating these two measures of asset liquidity to ﬁrms’ cost of capital. In
columns (1) and (3) we report the results of purely cross-sectional regressions based
on the time-series averages of the variables for each ﬁrm over the sample period. In
columns (2) and (4) we report the results of pooled (panel) OLS regressions with
three-digit SIC industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In all models we cluster the standard
errors at the three-digit SIC industry level.
The table shows that there is a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of
both inside and outside liquidity on the cost of capital in the cross-sectional tests.
Similarly, both inside and outside liquidity have reduce the cost of capital in the
tests which rely in the within-industry time-series variation in asset liquidity, but
the eﬀect of outside liquidity is not statistically signiﬁcant. The striking new result
in this table is that inside liquidity has a much larger eﬀect on the cost of capital
than outside liquidity. The pure cross-sectional results reported in columns (1) and
(3) imply that a one-standard deviation increase in inside liquidity decreases the cost
of capital by 1.6 percentage points per year, but a similar increase in outside liquidity
only decreases it by 0.7 percentage points per year. This diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant. For the within-industry results reported in columns (2) and (4), such an
22increase in inside liquidity reduces the cost of capital by 0.6 percentage points, but
the same increase in outside liquidity reduces it by only 0.2 percentage points. This
diﬀerence is also statistically signiﬁcant.
In sum, consistent with our second prediction, we ﬁnd that inside industry asset
liquidity has a much larger negative impact on the cost of capital than outside in-
dustry liquidity. This is consistent with the view that inside-industry acquirers can
better redeploy the asset than outside acquirers, and thus are willing to pay higher
prices. By making asset markets more liquid, the presence of inside buyers better
enhances ﬁrms’ operating ﬂexibility than outside liquidity, and thus has a stronger
negative eﬀect on ﬁrms’ cost of capital.
D. Cross-Sectional Variation in the Eﬀe c to fA s s e tL i q u i d i t yo nt h e
Cost of Capital
In this section, we seek to better understand the economic mechanism underlying
our previous ﬁndings. For this purpose, we explore whether the importance of asset
liquidity in explaining ﬁrms’ cost of capital varies across ﬁr m si nw a y st h a ta r e
consistent with the predictions derived from our main hypothesis.
D.1. Product Market Competition and Relative Industry Position
In Table 6 we test our predictions about how the nature of competition in product
markets and a ﬁrm’s competitive position may aﬀect the value of operating ﬂexibility.
In columns (1) and (2) we test prediction 4.a that the operating ﬂexibility provided
by a more liquid market for assets is more valuable to ﬁrms in more competitive
industries. Since the Census only reports the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)o f
sales concentration for manufacturing ﬁrms but our sample contains a large number
of non-manufacturing ﬁrms, we calculate a predicted concentration index for all ﬁrms
in our sample using the approach in Hoberg and Phillips (2009).13 We then split the
sample into ﬁr m st h a to p e r a t ei nah i g hHHI industry (with a predicted HHI in the
top tercile of the distribution) and those that operate in a low HHI industry (with
13In short, we regress concentration indices in manufacturing industries on employment levels
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics as well as on Compustat-based concentration indices
and other variables related to concentration. Since our predictors are available for all industries and
not just manufacturing, we then use the estimated coeﬃcients to predict the concentration indices
for all industries in our data.
23a predicted HHI in the bottom tercile of the distribution), and run our benchmark
regression with three-digit SIC industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects separately
for ﬁrms in each group. Consistent with our prediction 4.a, the coeﬃcients on both
NoPotBuy and TotM&A are negative and statistically signiﬁcant for ﬁrms in the
low HHI group, but they are much smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant or only
marginally signiﬁcant for ﬁrms in the high HHI group. The p-values for a formal one-
tailed test of the null that the eﬀect of asset liquidity is larger in the low HHI group
than it is in the high HHI group are 0.081 for NoPotBuy and 0.109 for TotM&A,
respectively. However, the eﬀect of MNLPotBuy does not diﬀer across ﬁrms in the
high and low HHI groups.
In columns (3) and (4) we test prediction 4.b that higher asset liquidity is more
valuable for the smallest ﬁrms in the industry. The industrial organization litera-
ture commonly denotes as “market leaders” those ﬁrms whose sales account for a
sizable percentage of the total gross sales in their industries. Following Haskel and
Scaramozzino (1997) and Campello (2006), we classify as “leaders” ﬁrms with mar-
ket shares of at least 15% in their three-digit SIC industry and classify as “followers”
ﬁrms with market shares below 15%. We then run our benchmark regression with
three-digit SIC industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects separately for ﬁrms in
each group. Consistent with our prediction 4.b, we ﬁnd that all of our measures of
asset liquidity have a large negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the cost
of capital of followers, but they have little eﬀect on the cost of capital of industry
leaders. For leaders, the coeﬃcients of NoPotBuy and TotM&A are close to zero
and are statistically insigniﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient on MNLPotBuy is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and negative but much smaller than it is for followers. The p-values
for a formal one-tailed test of the null that the eﬀect of asset liquidity is larger for
followers than it is for leaders are 0.046 for NoPotBuy,0 . 0 0 1f o rMNLPotBuy,a n d
0.006 for TotM&A, respectively.
D.2. Access to Capital, Financial Situation, and Business Environment
In Table 7 we test our predictions that asset liquidity should be more valuable
for ﬁrms with less access to external ﬁnancing and higher default risk (prediction
5.a). For this purpose, we ﬁrst run our benchmark regression with three-digit SIC
industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects separately for ﬁrms high and low access
24to ﬁnancing, as well as for ﬁrms with high and low probability of default. Since
the evidence in Faulkender and Petersen (2006) highlights the importance of having
access to public debt markets, in columns (1) and (2) we split the sample into ﬁrms
with unrated and rated debt. Consistent with prediction 5.a, we ﬁnd that both
NoPotBuy and TotM&A have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
cost of capital of ﬁrms with unrated debt, but that this eﬀect is slightly smaller
for ﬁrms with rated debt. These diﬀerences in the eﬀect of asset liquidity across
rated and unrated ﬁrms are suggestive, but not statistically signiﬁcant. There is no
diﬀerence in the eﬀect of MNLPotBuy across rated and unrated ﬁrms.
In columns (3) and (4) we then split the sample into ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hd e f a u l tr i s k
and low default risk, based on whether the distance of a ﬁrm’s probability of default
from the industry median is in the top or bottom tercile of the annual distribution
across all ﬁrms. Our approach in splitting the sample reﬂects the spirit of industry
equilibrium models which highlight the importance of a ﬁrm’s choices relative to
those of its industry rivals (e.g., Williams (1995)). Also supporting prediction 5.a,
we ﬁnd that all measures of asset liquidity have a stronger negative eﬀect on the cost
of capital in ﬁrms with high default risk than they do in ﬁrms with low default risk.
In fact, the eﬀect of TotM&A is not statistically signiﬁcant and is close to zero for
ﬁrms in the low default risk group. The p-values for a formal one-tailed test of the
null that the eﬀect of asset liquidity is larger for ﬁrm with high default risk than it
is for ﬁrms with low default risk are 0.102 for NoPotBuy,0 . 0 1 7f o rMNLPotBuy,a n d
0.005 for TotM&A, respectively.
In Table 8 we examine the predictions that the eﬀect of asset liquidity on ﬁrms’
cost of capital should be stronger for ﬁrms with lower market-to-book ratios and for
those facing negative demand shocks (prediction 5.b). To this end, in columns (1)
and (2) we split the sample into ﬁrms with low and high market-to-book value of
assets (V/A), according to whether the distance of a ﬁrm’s V/A from the industry
median is in the bottom or top tercile of the annual distribution across all ﬁrms. We
then run our benchmark regression with three-digit SIC industry ﬁxed eﬀects and
year ﬁxed eﬀects separately for ﬁrms in each sample. Consistent with prediction 5.b,
for all measures of asset liquidity we ﬁnd that their negative eﬀect on the cost of
capital is larger for ﬁrms with low market-to-book ratios than it is for ﬁrms with
25high market-to-book ratios. The p-values for a formal one-tailed test of the null that
the eﬀect of asset liquidity is larger for ﬁrm with low market-to-book ratios than
it is for ﬁrms with high market-to-book ratios are 0.154 for NoPotBuy,0 . 0 0 1f o r
MNLPotBuy, and 0.004 for TotM&A, respectively.
Last, we examine whether asset liquidity is more valuable for ﬁrms in industries
experiencing economic downturns. For this purpose, we follow Opler and Titman
(1994) and identify a three-digit SIC industry to be experiencing a downturn in
a given year when its median sales growth is negative and when its median stock
return is below -30%. In columns (3) and (4) we run our benchmark OLS regression
with year ﬁxed eﬀects separately for ﬁrms in industries experiencing a downturn and
those in industries that are not. We do not include the three-digit SIC industry
dummies because industry downturns are not long lasting and so few industries
remain in the downturn group for more than one year. We ﬁnd that our measures
of asset liquidity are negatively related to the cost of capital and are statistically
signiﬁcant for both samples of ﬁrms. Moreover, consistent with prediction 5.b, the
eﬀects of MNLPotBuy and TotM&A are substantially larger in magnitude for ﬁrms
in industries experiencing downturns than they are for ﬁrms in industries that are
not. One-tailed tests show that these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant (with
p-values 0.008 and 0.001, respectively). For NoPotBuy,w eﬁnd a smaller eﬀect of
asset liquidity during downturns, but the diﬀerence is small and not statistically
signiﬁcant.
V. Additional Robustness Tests
A. Controlling for Industry Valuation
In this section we explore whether a correlation between our measures of asset liquid-
ity and industry valuations could drive our results. Our ﬁrst two measures, NoPotBuy
and MNLPotBuy rely only on information on the existence and access to capital of
a ﬁrm’s industry rivals, which is largely outside the ﬁrm’s control. In addition, they
are not directly related to stock prices or industry valuations. However, industry
valuations could indirectly aﬀect NoPotBuy if during periods of high industry val-
uation new ﬁrms enter the industry or acquire debt ratings, and they could aﬀect
MNLPotBuy if during these periods industry rivals change their capital structures.
26More importantly, it is conceptually possible that our tests using TotM&A may suﬀer
from reverse causality: during periods of high industry valuations ﬁrms in the indus-
try have a low cost of capital, which in turn may lead to increased M&A activity in
the industry. In our prior analyses we address this issue by controlling for a ﬁrm’s
market-to-book ratio and stock price. We also show that our results hold in pure
cross-sectional tests which do not use the time-series variation in asset liquidity.
We further explore whether our results are driven by the time-series variation in
industry valuations. For this purpose, in Table 9 we repeat our analyses after explic-
itly controlling for two alternative measures of industry valuations constructed at the
three-digit SIC industry level. The ﬁrst is the logarithm of the average market-to-
book equity ratio in the industry (LogIndMB). The second is the industry’s valuation
relative to historical values (IndRelVal). As in Hoberg and Phillips (2009), we con-
struct this variable as the diﬀerence between the industry’s log market-to-book equity
ratio and its predicted value from the benchmark speciﬁcation in Pástor and Veronesi
(2003). In columns (1) and (3) we run purely cross-sectional OLS regressions using
the time-series averages of the variables over the sample period for each ﬁrm and
in columns (2) and (4) we run pooled (panel) OLS regressions with three-digit SIC
industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In columns (1) and (2) we control for
LogIndMB and in columns (3) and (4) we control for IndRelVal, respectively.
Including these industry valuation and miss-valuation measures in our regression
models does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the coeﬃcients on NoPotBuy, MNLPot-
Buy,o rTotM&A, which remain negative and statistically signiﬁcant for both esti-
mation approaches. The results suggest that a correlation between our measures of
asset liquidity with industry valuations does not drive our results. They also suggest
that a reverse causality driven by changes in industry valuations over time does not
explain our results based on TotM&A.
B. Industry-Level Tests
Our main analyses are based on ﬁrm-level regressions of the cost of capital on mea-
sures of asset liquidity which are largely measured at the industry level. An alterna-
tive estimation approach is to convert the cost of capital and our control variables
27into three-digit SIC industry-level medians and then estimate the regressions at the
industry level. Hence, in Table 10 we report the results of industry-level regression
models estimated by weighted least squares (WLS), wherein the weights on each
industry-year observation are the number of ﬁrms in the industry. The coeﬃcient
estimates obtained using the cross-sectional approach are reported in columns (1),
(3), and (5) and those obtained using the within-industry time-series variation are
reported in columns (2), (4), and (6). As we did before, we cluster the standard
errors by three-digit SIC industry. In our industry-level tests we continue to ﬁnd
a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relation between all three measures of asset
liquidity and the cost of capital.
C. Tests Based on the Unlevered Cost of Capital
Since previous work suggests that asset liquidity may aﬀe c td e b tc a p a c i t y( S h l e i f e r
and Vishny (1992) and Morellec (2001)), which in turn aﬀects ﬁrms’ cost of capital,
we investigate whether an association between asset liquidity and ﬁnancial leverage
could drive our results. Throughout the paper we deal with this issue by including
ﬁnancial leverage as a control variable in all our tests. In this section, we repeat our
tests using the unlevered cost of capital, which eliminates any concerns that ﬁnancial
leverage might alter our results.
To estimate the unlevered cost of capital we delever ICC using the Modigliani-
Miller formula with taxes. In addition to market debt-to-equity ratios and the top
corporate tax rate, the formula requires that we measure each ﬁrm’s cost of debt. We
estimate the cost of debt for each ﬁrm-year in our sample by mapping a ﬁrm’s S&P
debt rating to the average bond yield in its rating category. Since only a limited
number of ﬁrms have credit ratings, we estimate missing credit ratings for other
ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, for the subset of companies with credit ratings, we use a set of
explanatory variables to estimate an Ordered Logit model that predicts the S&P
debt rating. Our predictors are the natural logarithm of a ﬁrm’s assets, ﬁnancial
leverage, proﬁtability, interest coverage, the natural logarithm of a ﬁrm’s age, and
the volatility of excess returns. Next, we use the estimated coeﬃcients from this
model to predict the debt rating for all the companies whose ratings are missing, but
have the complete set of predictors. For each year, we match a ﬁrm’s debt rating to
28the average bond yield in its rating category, based on individual yields on new debt
issues obtained from SDC.
Table 11 reports regressions of the unlevered implied cost of capital on our three
measures of asset liquidity. In columns (1), (3), and (5) we run purely cross-sectional
OLS regressions using the time-series averages of the variables over the sample period
for each ﬁrm. In columns (2), (4), and (6) we run pooled (panel) OLS regressions
with three-digit SIC industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We cluster the
standard errors by three-digit SIC industry in all models. The control variables are
identical to those we use before, except that we omit ﬁnancial leverage. Our results
show that ﬁnancial leverage does not explain the eﬀect of asset liquidity on the cost
of capital. For all measures of asset liquidity and estimation approaches, we ﬁnd that
the estimated coeﬃcients are similar in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance
to those reported in Table 4.
D. Robustness to Biases in Analyst Earnings Forecasts
While the ICC is very attractive because it is a forward-looking measure of a ﬁrm’s
expected return, a potential weakness is that it relies on analyst forecasts. In calcu-
lating the ICC we assume that analysts’ consensus forecast is an unbiased estimate of
investors’ expectations. However, as pointed out by some recent papers (e.g. Easton
and Monahan (2005)), one problem with this assumption is that there is evidence
that analysts make biased earnings forecasts. This raises the question of whether
biased analyst forecasts could in turn bias our inferences.
If analyst forecasts are equally biased for all stocks, then this average bias would
not have any eﬀect on our results. However, our analyses could be aﬀected if the bias
in analysts’ forecasts is related to asset liquidity. If the forecasts are systematically
biased in favor of ﬁrms with higher asset liquidity, then the estimate of the ICC will
be biased upwards for these ﬁrms. This would lead to an understatement of the eﬀect
of asset liquidity on the ICC. Conversely, if the forecasts are systematically biased
against ﬁrms with higher asset liquidity, then the estimate of the ICC will be biased
downwards for these ﬁrms. This would lead to an overstatement of the eﬀect of asset
liquidity on the ICC.
29To address this issue, we ﬁrst examine whether the bias in analysts’ forecasts
is related to our asset liquidity measures. The pair-wise correlations between the
forecast bias and NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy,o rTotM&A are fairly low (less than 4%
in absolute value). We then add the forecast bias to our regressions and repeat our
analyses, but consistent with the low correlation between the forecast bias and the
asset liquidity variables this has no eﬀect on our results. Last, we re-run our main
analyses after dropping from the sample those ﬁrms with analysts’ forecasts biases
in the top 30% or the 50% of the annual distribution. Again, this has no eﬀect on
our results. In sum, there is no indication that our results could be driven by the
biases in analysts’ earnings forecasts.
E. Tests Using a Measure of Asset Liquidity Based on Acquisition
Premiums
We examine an additional fourth measure of asset liquidity which also comes from
the M&A market. This measure captures the idea that ﬁrm’s assets are more liquid
when targets operating in the industry are sold at higher premiums. Put diﬀerently,
higher acquisition premiums are likely to be associated with more competition by
buyers of a ﬁrm’s assets.14
We calculate this measure using information on all merger deals involving publicly
traded targets recorded in SDC. For each deal, we ﬁrst compute the acquisition
premium as (bidder’s oﬀer price — target’s pre-bid price) / target’s pre-bid price,
where the target’s pre-bid price is its share price 30 days prior to the announcement.
For each industry and year with at least one transaction, we compute an average
premium across all targets in the same three-digit SIC industry. For industry-years
with no transactions, we set the premium to be equal to the minimum premium
recorded across all industries in that year. We use this approach because the assets in
industries with no transactions are likely to be the least liquid and thus the potential
premiums they could obtain if sold are very low. In fact, on average the premium we
impute is -34%, that is, a signiﬁcant price discount.15 The ﬁnal measure, IndPrem,
14We thank Itay Goldstein for this suggestion.
15What is the premium that should be assigned to industries with no mergers is not entirely
obvious and our approach is not without ﬂaws. However, the key issue is that an imputation is
necessary, as otherwise we would be forced to drop from our analysis industries with no merger
transactions. Since these industries are likely to be those with the most illiquid assets, dropping
30results from averaging the acquisition premium for each industry over the past ﬁve
years.
We ﬁnd that a higher value of M&A deals is associated with higher acquisition
premiums (the correlation between TotM&A and IndPrem is 53%). This counters the
argument that a higher volume of transactions could in fact be associated with illiquid
transactions. Moreover, in analyses that are available upon request, we run our cross-
sectional and time-series regressions of the implied cost of capital on IndPrem and
the control variables in our benchmark empirical model. As we did before, we cluster
our standard errors by three-digit SIC industry. For all speciﬁcations we consider,
we ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of IndPrem on the implied cost
of capital. The economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of IndPrem is similar to that we
obtain using TotM&A.
F. Measurement of Asset Liquidity for Multi-Segment Firms
Two of our measures of asset liquidity, NoPotBuy and MNLPotBuy, depend on identi-
fying the rivals a ﬁrm faces in its industry. In our main tests, we assign competitors to
each ﬁrm based on their primary SIC code. We now further reﬁne these measures to
incorporate the individual segments multiple-segment ﬁrms operate. The industry-
level measures now consider all competitors a ﬁrm faces, including the secondary
segments of multiple-segment ﬁrms.
Using these updated measures of asset liquidity which incorporate multi-segment
ﬁrms, for each ﬁrm we compute a weighted average measure of industry asset liquidity
that takes into account the industries in which it operates. We calculate the industry
asset liquidity a multiple-segment ﬁrms faces as the weighted-average asset liquidity
of each of its three-digit SIC industry segments, with weights equal to the fraction of
a ﬁrm’s total assets accounted for by each segment’s assets. We do this last step for
the asset liquidity measure TotM&A as well. For all three measures of asset liquidity
the results are similar in signﬁcance to those reported.
those industries would cause a serious sample-selection bias.
31G. Controlling for Stock Liquidity and Cash Holdings
It is possible that the liquidity of a ﬁrm’s assets could be empirically related with a
high volume of trading in the ﬁrm’s stock. Since ﬁr m sw i t hm o r el i q u i ds t o c k st e n d
to have a lower cost of capital, a positive correlation between the liquidity of a ﬁrm’s
real assets and the liquidity of its stock could explain our results. However, the eﬀect
of asset liquidity on the cost of capital is unaﬀected if we control for stock liquidity
using a ﬁrm’s share turnover or the average share turnover of ﬁrms in the three-digit
SIC industry.
Recent work argues that cash holdings allow a ﬁrm to fund investment and to en-
dure negative cash ﬂow shocks (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999),
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), and Acharya, Almeida, and Campello
(2007)). As a result, higher cash holdings are likely to reduce default risk and thus
the cost of capital. It then follows that a positive correlation of our measures of real
asset liquidity with cash holdings could drive our ﬁndings. To address this issue,
we repeat our regressions of the implied cost of capital on asset liquidity and fur-
ther include a ﬁrm’s raw or excess cash holdings16 as an additional control variable.
However, this does not aﬀect our results.
H. Alternative Methods to Assess Statistical Signiﬁcance
Since the key test variables in our regression analyses (MNLPotBuy, NoPotBuy,
and TotM&A) are measured at the three-digit SIC industry-level, throughout the
paper we cluster the standard errors by three-digit SIC industry. For robustness, we
re-estimate our main speciﬁcations clustering our standard errors by both industry
and year, by ﬁrm, by year, and by both ﬁrm and year, but all of these alternative
approaches give t-statistics that are similar or larger than those reported. Hence, the
approach we use to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of our results is conservative.
16Excess cash holdings are the residual of a regression of log cash holdings scaled by assets (net
of cash) on various predictors identiﬁed in previous research (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999)) as well as year and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
32VI. Conclusions
We argue that a more liquid market for real assets reduces a ﬁrm’s cost of unwinding
its capital stock and it increases its ability to raise cash, both of which provide
the ﬁrm with ﬂexibility in responding to a changing business environment and are
especially valuable in bad times - a point that has been shown to be especially true
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Thus, we hypothesize that asset liquidity increases
a ﬁrm’s operating ﬂexibility and as a result it reduces the ﬁrm’s cost of capital.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we ﬁnd an aggregate asset-liquidity discount in
ﬁrms’ cost of capital that is strongly counter-cyclical. Moreover, we show that ﬁrms
operating in industries with high asset liquidity have a much lower cost of capital both
in cross-sectional and time-series tests. These results are robust to using diﬀerent
measures of potential and historical asset liquidity within an industry, as well as
to measuring a ﬁrm’s expected returns using the implied cost of capital and the
Fama-French three-factor model cost of capital.
Our tests also show that the eﬀect of asset liquidity on the cost of capital varies
across and within industries in ways that are consistent with operating ﬂexibility
being an important determinant of ﬁrms’ cost of capital. Consistent with theories
suggesting that buyers who operate in the same industry are willing to pay higher
prices for an asset than buyers who operate outside the industry, we also ﬁnd that
higher asset liquidity from within the industry lowers a ﬁrm’s cost of capital more
than asset liquidity from outside the industry. In addition, asset liquidity lowers the
cost of capital more for ﬁrms that face more competitive risk in product markets,
have less access to external ﬁnancing, are closer to default, have lower valuations,
and face negative demand shocks.
Taken together, our results suggest that asset liquidity is a major determinant
of a ﬁrm’s operating ﬂexibility, and that it has an economically signiﬁcant impact
on a ﬁrm’s cost of capital. More generally, our study highlights the importance of
real-side fundamentals as important drivers of the required return on equity as well
as the importance of industry factors in asset pricing.
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics for Main Variables 
            
The table reports summary statistics for the measures of cost of capital, the asset liquidity measures defined for three-digit 
SIC industries, and the variables that serve as controls in our analyses. The dependent variables in our tests are ICC, the 
implied cost of capital of Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), and FFCC, the Fama-French three-factor model cost of 
capital. The summary statistics on the independent variables are calculated on the sample of firm for which we can calculate 
the implied cost of capital, which covers the period 1984-2006 and contains 6,260 firms and a total of 33,788 firm-year 
observations (financial institutions and utilities are excluded from the sample). However, the summary statistics for the 
FFCC are calculated using the larger sample of firms for which we are able to calculate FFCC during 1984-2006. We use 
various measures of asset liquidity which, for ease of comparison, are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation 
of one by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by their sample standard deviation. These measures are as follows: 
NoPotBuy is the number of rival firms in the industry that have debt ratings, and is calculated for the period 1985-2006 
because bond ratings become available in 1985 (the tests which use this variable rely on 6,180 firms and 33,052 firm-year 
observations); MNLPotBuy is minus the average book leverage net of cash holdings of rival firms in the industry, averaged 
over the past five years; TotM&A is the value of all M&A activity in the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the 
industry, averaged over the past five years; InsM&A is the value of M&A activity in the industry involving acquirers that 
operate within the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years; OutM&A 
is the value of M&A activity in the industry involving acquirers that operate outside the industry scaled by the book value of 
the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher values of all these variables are associated with higher 
asset liquidity. The control variables we use throughout our tests are as follows: LogAssets is the logarithm of total assets; 
M/B is the market-to-book assets ratio; DRP is a firm’s percentile ranking based on the yearly distribution of default risk; 
Blev is book leverage; ROE is return on equity; VolRoe is the standard deviation of ROE over the past five years; FA/TA is 
fixed assets scaled by total assets; R&DExp is R&D expenditures scaled by sales; LogAge is the logarithm of one plus the 
number of years since the company was first listed in CRSP; DivPay equals one if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise; 
SalGrow is the annual change in the logarithm of sales; LogInvPrice is the logarithm of one divided by the stock price as of the 
estimation date of ICC; and RetPM is the stock return over the past month. 
 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Median  5th Pctile  95th Pctile 
          
Dependent Variables 
          
ICC 0.099  0.057  0.107  0.001  0.179 
FFCC 0.142  0.091  0.137  0.004  0.301 
          
Standardized Asset Liquidity Measures 
          
NoPotBuy 0.000  1.000  -0.383 -0.950  2.098 
MNLPotBuy 0.000  1.000  -0.182 -1.461  1.831 
TotM&A 0.000  1.000  -0.361  -1.002  2.243 
InsM&A 0.000  1.000  -0.413  -0.792  2.376 
OutM&A 0.000  1.000  -0.390 -0.884  2.216 
          
Control Variables 
          
LogAssets 6.363  1.792  6.215  3.705  9.604 
M/B 1.870  1.712  1.350 0.601  4.936 
DRP 0.500  0.288  0.500  0.050  0.950 
Blev 0.210  0.182  0.189  0.000  0.549 
ROE 0.045  3.037  0.069  -0.236  0.194 
VolROE 0.087  0.128 0.050 0.009 0.267 
FA/TA 0.300  0.225  0.242 0.036  0.767 
R&DExp 0.068  0.207  0.005  0.000  0.254 
LogAge 2.349  0.966 2.303 0.693 4.043 
DivPay 0.429  0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Salgrow 0.157  0.255  0.119 -0.177  0.629 
LogInvPrice -2.986  0.819  -3.056  -4.191  -1.504 
RetPM 0.036  0.142  0.026 -0.165  0.273 
          
  
Table 2  
Asset Liquidity and the Cost of Capital: Univariate Tests 
 
The table reports the average cost of capital for quintile portfolios of firms formed using three alternative measures of asset liquidity 
defined for three-digit SIC industries: NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, and TotM&A. These measures are standardized to have mean zero and 
standard deviation of one. NoPotBuy is the number of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings; MNLPotBuy is 
minus the average book leverage net of cash holdings of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry, averaged over the past five years; and 
TotM&A is the value of all M&A activity in the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past 
five years. Higher values of all three variables are associated with higher asset liquidity. For each year we sort firms into quintile 
portfolios based on the asset liquidity measure in their three-digit SIC industry. We then compute the average cost of capital for each 
quintile portfolio, and subsequently take the average for each quintile across years. The last column reports p-value corresponding to 
the test of the difference in means between Quintile 5 and Quintile 1. In Panels A, B, and C we measure a firm’s expected return using 
the implied cost of capital (ICC) and rely on the sample described in Table 1. In Panel D we measure a firm’s expected return using the 
Fama-French three-factor model (FFCC) and rely on the sample of all firms for which we are able to calculate FFCC during 1984-2006.
 
Panel A: ICC for Quintile Portfolios Based on (standardized) NoPotBuy 
 
 Asset  Liquidity  Quintile     
  Q1   Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5 – Q1  p-value 
              
Mean NoPotBuy  -0.88  -0.68 -0.36 0.23 1.17  2.05  0.000 
              
Equal-Weighted ICC  12.10%  11.76%  10.73% 9.39%  7.80%  -4.29%  0.000 
              
Value-Weighted ICC  9.86%  9.23%  9.78% 8.90% 7.13%  -2.73%  0.000 
              
 
Panel B: ICC for Quintile Portfolios Based on (standardized) MNLPotBuy 
 
 Asset  Liquidity  Quintile     
  Q1   Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5 – Q1  p-value 
              
Mean NLPotBuy  -1.23  -0.65 -0.16 0.50 1.20  2.43  0.000 
              
Equal-Weighted ICC  12.33%  12.29%  11.29% 9.90%  7.25%  -5.08%  0.000 
              
Value-Weighted ICC  11.58%  10.43%  9.56% 8.45% 5.06%  -6.52%  0.000 
              
 
Panel C: ICC for Quintile Portfolios Based on (standardized) TotM&A 
 
 Asset  Liquidity  Quintile     
  Q1   Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5 – Q1  p-value 
              
Mean TotM&A  -0.92  -0.62 -0.30 0.15 1.24  2.17  0.000 
              
Equal-Weighted ICC  12.54%  11.25%  10.39% 10.28%  8.59%  -3.96%  0.000 
              
Value-Weighted ICC  10.73%  9.34%  9.01% 9.01% 6.92%  -3.80%  0.000 
              
 
Panel D: Value-Weighted FFCC for Quintile Portfolios Based on (standardized) Asset Liquidity 
 
 Asset  Liquidity  Quintile     
Asset Liquidity Measure  Q1   Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5 – Q1  p-value 
              
(1) NoPotBuy  12.30%  10.95%  10.49% 10.48%  9.17%  -3.13%  0.000 
              
(2) MNLPotBuy  11.45%  11.37%  11.33% 10.57%  7.09%  -4.36%  0.000 
              
(3) TotM&A  11.56%  10.74%  10.36% 10.23%  8.73%  -2.83%  0.000 




Business-Cycle Effects on the Asset-Liquidity Discount 
        
The table reports the results of OLS time-series univariate regressions of the annual average asset-liquidity discount on various 
business-cycle indicators that we obtain from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). In Panel A we measure a 
firm’s expected return using the implied cost of capital (ICC) and in Panel B we measure it using the Fama-French three-factor 
model (FFCC). For the tests using both ICC and FFCC, we calculate three different versions of the asset-liquidity discount using 
three alternative measures of asset liquidity defined for three-digit SIC industries which are standardized to have mean zero and 
standard deviation of one. In all cases the asset-liquidity discount is the difference between the average cost of capital (in %) for 
firms in the highest and lowest asset-liquidity quintiles. The first asset-liquidity discount is calculated using standardized NoPotBuy, 
which is the number of rival firms in the industry that have debt ratings. The second asset-liquidity discount is calculated using 
standardized MNLPBuy, which is minus the average book leverage net of cash holdings of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry, 
averaged over the past five years. The third asset-liquidity discount is calculated using standardized TotM&A, which is defined as 
the value of all M&A activity in the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. 
Higher values of all three variables are associated with higher asset liquidity. The regressions with the asset liquidity discount based 
on NoPotBuy are based on the 22 annual observations during the period 1985-2006 and the regressions with asset liquidity discounts 
based on MNLPotBuy and TotM&A are based on the 23 annual observations during the period 1984-2006 and. GDP Growth is the 
year-over-year growth in the fourth quarter’s GDP; Capacity Utilization is the utilization rate of the installed capacity in the 
manufacturing sector for the fourth quarter of each year; Inflation is the year-over-year change in the December’s Consumer Price 
Index; T-Bill Rate is the average three-month Treasury Bill Rate during the corresponding year; Default Spread is the average spread 
between the yield on Moody’s Baa corporate bond index and the yield of ten-year government bonds during the year; Market Return 
is the annual return on the market portfolio (in %). The estimates of the intercept are omitted. The absolute values of t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are calculated using standard errors obtained from a Newey-West procedure that accounts for any significant 
autocorrelation. The R2 of each univariate regression is reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Discount in the ICC 
 
          
      The Dep. Var. is the Asset-Liquidity Discount Based on:
          
     NoPotBuy  MNLPotBuy  TotM&A 
          
          
(1) GDP  Growth  Coef.  0.876***  0.845***  0.750*** 
   t-stat  (2.86)  (6.50)  (5.50) 
   R 2 [19.88%]  [26.27%]  [16.27%] 
          
          
(2) Capacity  Utilization  Coef.  0.230***  0.299**  0.463*** 
   t-stat  (4.14)  (2.60)  (5.45) 
   R 2 [10.33%]  [17.61%]  [33.11%] 
          
          
(3) Inflation  Coef.  0.656***  0.450*  0.972*** 
   t-stat  (3.42)  (1.81)  (4.12) 
   R 2 [9.80%]  [4.78%]  [17.51%] 
          
          
(4) T-Bill  Rate  Coef.  0.748***  0.728***  0.935*** 
   t-stat  (3.67)  (7.33)  (8.85) 
   R 2 [37.32%]  [45.68%]  [59.20%] 
          
          
(5) Default  Spread  Coef. -0.748  -1.802**  -2.789*** 
   t-stat  (0.75)  (2.08)  (4.39) 
   R 2 [1.95%]  [11.67%]  [21.95%] 
          
          
(6) Market  Return  Coef.  0.038***  0.049***  0.045*** 
   t-stat  (3.10)  (4.87)  (3.66) 
   R 2 [6.25%]  [10.67%]  [7.06%] 
           
 
 
Panel B: Discount in the FFCC 
 
          
      The Dep. Var. is the Asset-Liquidity Discount Based on:
          
     NoPotBuy  MNLPotBuy  TotM&A 
          
          
(1) GDP  Growth  Coef.  0.845**  0.455***  0.550*** 
   t-stat  (2.30)  (4.66)  (5.53) 
   R 2 23.15%  13.41%  17.37% 
          
          
(2) Capacity  Utilization  Coef.  0.483***  0.140**  0.234*** 
   t-stat  (4.00)  (2.58)  (5.64) 
   R 2 56.93%  6.78%  16.72% 
          
          
(3) Inflation  Coef.  0.474*  0.884***  0.398 
   t-stat  (1.85)  (6.18)  (1.32) 
   R 2 6.40%  32.40%  5.82% 
          
          
(4) T-Bill  Rate  Coef.  0.525***  0.391***  0.333*** 
   t-stat  (3.56)  (3.05)  (4.41) 
   R 2 23.00%  23.11%  14.91% 
          
          
(5) Default  Spread  Coef.  -3.570*** -1.120***  -1.544*** 
   t-stat  (5.91)  (4.45)  (4.50) 
   R 2 55.62%  7.92%  13.34% 
          
  
 
Table 4   
Asset Liquidity and the Cost of Capital: Multivariate Analysis 
       
The table reports the results from regressions of the implied cost of capital (ICC) and the Fama-French three-factor model cost of capital 
(FFCC) on the three alternative standardized measures of asset liquidity calculated for three-digit SIC industries (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, 
and TotM&A,) and a set of control variables. Panel A reports the results using ICC. In columns (1), (3), and (5) we report an OLS purely 
cross-sectional regression using the time-series averages of the variables over the sample period for each firm, with standard errors 
clustered by three-digit SIC industry. In columns (2), (4), and (6) we report a pooled (panel) OLS regression with three-digit SIC industry 
fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. Panel B reports the results using FFCC. In 
columns (1), (3), and (5) we report an OLS purely cross-sectional regression using the time-series averages of the variables over the sample 
period for each firm, with standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. In columns (2), (4), and (6) we report Fama-MacBeth 
regressions and report t-statistics which are adjusted for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure based on 6 lags. The following 
measures of asset liquidity are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one: NoPotBuy is the number of rival firms in the 
three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings; MNLPotBuy is minus the average book leverage net of cash holdings of rival firms in the 
three-digit SIC industry, averaged over the past five years; and TotM&A is the value of all M&A activity in the industry scaled by the book 
value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher values of all three variables are associated with higher asset 
liquidity. The control variables are as follows: LogAssets is the logarithm of total assets; M/B is the market-to-book assets ratio; DRP is a 
firm’s percentile ranking based on the yearly distribution of default risk; Blev is book leverage; ROE is return on equity; VolRoe is the 
standard deviation of ROE over the past five years; FA/TA is fixed assets scaled by total assets; R&DExp is R&D expenditures scaled by 
sales; LogAge is the logarithm of one plus the number of years since the company was first listed in CRSP; DivPay equals one if the firm 
pays dividends and zero otherwise; SalGrow is the annual change in the logarithm of sales; LogInvPrice is the logarithm of one divided by 
the stock price as of the estimation date of ICC; and RetPM is the stock return over the past month. The estimates of the intercept, the 
year fixed effects, and the industry fixed effects are omitted. The absolute values of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each 
estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
  
 
Panel A: The Dependent Variable is the Implied Cost of Capital (ICC) 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
NoPotBuy -0.018***  -0.015***         
 (5.65)  (2.97)         
MNLPotBuy     -0.019***  -0.011***    
     (7.08)  (6.36)    
TotM&A         -0.014***  -0.005*** 
         (9.40)  (2.64) 
LogAssets  -0.005*** -0.001 -0.008*** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.001 
 (4.48)  (1.12)  (7.83)  (1.18) (7.08) (1.36) 
M/B -0.008***  -0.004***  -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.004*** 
 (5.63)  (5.19)  (5.75)  (5.02) (5.52) (5.28) 
DRP 0.036***  0.023***  0.040*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 
 (7.24)  (9.60)  (8.51)  (10.52) (5.72) (10.61) 
Blev 0.020*  -0.009  0.003  -0.008 0.033*** -0.008 
 (1.94)  (1.18)  (0.26)  (1.08) (2.74) (1.07) 
ROE 0.002*  0.000***  0.002* 0.000*** 0.002* 0.000*** 
 (1.74)  (3.66)  (1.77)  (3.75) (1.82) (3.69) 
VolROE -0.051***  -0.026***  -0.059*** -0.027*** -0.062*** -0.027*** 
 (6.10)  (8.47)  (6.62)  (8.65) (8.04) (9.02) 
FA/TA 0.002  0.006  -0.031***  0.006 -0.021* 0.006 
 (0.17)  (1.30)  (2.63)  (1.30) (1.76) (1.30) 
R&DExp -0.012  -0.012  -0.007  -0.012 -0.017* -0.013 
 (0.85)  (0.90)  (0.58)  (0.89) (1.75) (0.97) 
LogAge -0.001*  -0.002**  -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** 
 (1.80)  (2.36)  (0.69)  (2.48) (1.34) (2.11) 
DivPay 0.013***  0.004***  0.016*** 0.004*** 0.017*** 0.004*** 
 (5.80)  (3.74)  (6.78)  (3.79) (7.28) (3.82) 
SalGrow  -0.016*** 0.003 -0.020*** 0.003  -0.015**  0.003 
 (3.93)  (0.97)  (3.29)  (0.97) (2.31) (1.00) 
LogInvPrice -0.003  0.005***  -0.006*** 0.004***  -0.004*  0.004*** 
 (1.42)  (3.88)  (3.03)  (3.87) (1.75) (3.63) 
RetPM -0.025***  -0.011***  -0.030*** -0.009*** -0.030*** -0.010*** 
 (2.84)  (3.57)  (2.97)  (2.99) (3.28) (3.21) 
Constant 0.117***  0.148***  0.141*** 0.171*** 0.141*** 0.169*** 
 (10.72)  (31.53)  (15.68)  (42.33) (15.99) (38.02) 
        
Year  Dummies  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
SIC3  Dummies  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Estimation  Cross-Sectional Panel Cross-Sectional Panel Cross-Sectional Panel 
Clustering  by  SIC3  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations  6180 33052 6260 33788 6260 33788 
R-squared 0.36  0.54  0.34 0.55 0.32 0.54 




Panel B: The Dependent Variable is the Fama-French Cost of Capital (FFCC) 
           
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
           
NoPotBuy -0.004**  -0.005**         
 (2.29)  (2.77)         
MNLPotBuy     -0.006***  -0.005***    
     (3.03)  (5.03)     
TotM&A        -0.008***  -0.004** 
        (3.78)  (2.20) 
           
All Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimation Cross-Sectional  Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Fama-MacBeth 
Clustering  by  SIC3  Yes No Yes  No  Yes  No 
Newey-West 6 lags  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
           
Observations 9930  73893  10180  76575  10180  76575 




Inside Vs. Outside Asset Liquidity and the Implied Cost of Capital 
 
The table reports the results from regressions of the implied cost of capital (ICC) on two standardized measures of asset liquidity 
defined at the three-digit SIC industry level (InsM&Q and OutM&A) and a set of control variables. In columns (1) and (3) we report 
an OLS purely cross-sectional regression using the time-series averages of the variables over the sample period for each firm, with 
standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. In columns (2) and (4) we report a pooled (panel) OLS regression with three-
digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. The following 
measures of asset liquidity are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one: InsM&A is the value of M&A activity 
in the industry involving acquirers that operate within the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged 
over the past five years; OutM&A is the value of M&A activity in the industry involving acquirers that operate outside the industry 
scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher values of all three variables are 
associated with higher asset liquidity. We also include but do not report the coefficients of the following control variables defined in 
Table 1: LogAssets, M/B, DRP, Blev, ROE, VolRoe, FA/TA, R&DExp, LogAge, DivPay, SalGrow, LogInvPrice, and RetPM. The estimates 
of the intercept, the year fixed effects, and the industry fixed effects are also omitted. The absolute values of the t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
       
InsM&A -0.016***  -0.006***    
 (9.09)  (2.78)     
OutM&A     -0.007***  -0.002 
     (2.80)  (1.51) 
        
All Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Dummies No Yes No  Yes 
SIC3  Dummies No Yes No  Yes 
Estimation Cross-Sectional  Panel Cross-Sectional  Panel 
Clustering by SIC3  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Observations 6260  33788  6260  33788 
R-squared 0.33  0.55  0.29  0.54 




The Role of Industry Concentration and Industry Position 
       
The table reports the results from regressions of the implied cost of capital (ICC) on the three alternative standardized measures of 
asset liquidity calculated for three-digit SIC industries (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, and TotM&A,) and a set of control variables. All 
specifications are pooled (panel) OLS regressions with three-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors 
clustered by three-digit SIC industry. Columns (1)-(2) split the sample into high concentration industries and low concentration 
industries according to whether the industry’s predicted sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration (HHI) is in the top 
or bottom tercile of the annual distribution, respectively. Columns (3)-(4) split the sample into industry leaders, defined as firms with 
at least a 15% market share in their three-digit SIC industry, and industry followers, defined as those with market shares below 15%, 
respectively. The following measures of asset liquidity are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one: NoPotBuy is 
the number of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings; MNLPotBuy is minus the average book leverage net of 
cash holdings of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry, averaged over the past five years; and TotM&A is the value of all M&A 
activity in the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher values of all 
three variables are associated with higher asset liquidity. We also include but do not report the coefficients of the following control 
variables defined in Table 1: LogAssets, M/B, DRP, Blev, ROE, VolRoe, FA/TA, R&DExp, LogAge, DivPay, SalGrow, LogInvPrice, and 
RetPM. The estimates of the intercept, the year fixed effects, and the industry fixed effects are also omitted. The absolute values of the 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  High HHI   Low HHI   Leaders  Followers 
  (1)  (2)   (3)   (4) 
       
Panel A: The measure of asset liquidity is NoPotBuy 
 
       
NoPotBuy -0.007*  -0.021** 0.003  -0.015*** 
 (1.94)  (2.33)  (0.32)  (2.94) 
       
Includes all control variables, year dummies, and SIC3 dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3
       
Observations  10626 10362 5412 27640 
R-squared  0.55  0.60 0.57 0.55 
       
       
Panel B: The measure of asset liquidity is MNLPotBuy 
 
       
MNLPotBuy -0.011***  -0.010*** -0.004** -0.012*** 
 (2.97)  (4.87)  (2.16)  (5.68) 
       
Includes all control variables, year dummies, and SIC3 dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3
       
Observations  10853 10582 5552 28236 
R-squared  0.56  0.60 0.57 0.55 
       
       
Panel C: The measure of asset liquidity is TotM&A 
 
       
TotM&A -0.002  -0.007**  -0.000  -0.006*** 
 (1.02)  (2.10)  (0.32)  (2.74) 
       
Includes all control variables, year dummies, and SIC3 dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3
       
Observations  10853 10582 5552 28236 
R-squared  0.55  0.60 0.57 0.55 





The Effect of Access to Debt Financing and Default Risk 
       
The table reports the results from regressions of the implied cost of capital (ICC) on the three alternative standardized measures of 
asset liquidity calculated for three-digit SIC industries (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, and TotM&A,) and a set of control variables. All 
specifications are pooled (panel) OLS regressions with three-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors 
clustered by three-digit SIC industry. Columns (1)-(2) split the sample into firms with debt but no debt ratings and those whose debt 
is rated, respectively. Columns (3)-(4) split the sample into firms with high distress risk and low distress risk based on whether the 
distance of a firm’s probability of default from the industry median is in the top or bottom tercile of the annual distribution across all 
firms, respectively. The following measures of asset liquidity are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one: 
NoPotBuy is the number of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings; MNLPotBuy is minus the average book 
leverage net of cash holdings of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry, averaged over the past five years; and TotM&A is the value 
of all M&A activity in the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher 
values of all three variables are associated with higher asset liquidity. We also include but do not report the coefficients of the 
following control variables defined in Table 1: LogAssets, M/B, DRP, Blev, ROE, VolRoe, FA/TA, R&DExp, LogAge, DivPay, SalGrow, 
LogInvPrice, and RetPM. The estimates of the intercept, the year fixed effects, and the industry fixed effects are also omitted. The 
absolute values of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Unrated Debt  Rated Debt  High Default Risk  Low Default Risk 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Panel A: The measure of asset liquidity is NoPotBuy 
 
        
NoPotBuy -0.014**  -0.013*** -0.014***  -0.008*** 
 (2.55)  (3.65)  (2.78)  (2.75) 
        
Includes all control variables, year dummies, and SIC3 dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3 
        
Observations 15400  12331  11250  10968 
R-squared 0.54  0.54  0.49  0.55 
        
        
Panel B: The measure of asset liquidity is MNLPotBuy 
 
        
MNLPotBuy -0.010***  -0.011*** -0.014**  -0.009*** 
 (5.65)  (3.90)  (5.65)  (2.94) 
        
Includes all control variables, year dummies, and SIC3 dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3 
        
Observations 16079  12331  11501  11211 
R-squared 0.55  0.54  0.49  0.56 
        
       
Panel C: The measure of asset liquidity is TotM&A 
 
        
TotM&A -0.005**  -0.003**  -0.007***  -0.002 
 (2.27)  (2.11)  (3.44)  (1.34) 
        
Includes all control variables, year dummies, and SIC3 dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3 
        
Observations 16079  12331  11501  11211 
R-squared 0.55  0.53  0.49  0.56 
         
 
Table 8 
The Effect of Market Valuations and Demand Shocks 
       
The table reports the results from regressions of the implied cost of capital (ICC) on the three alternative standardized measures of 
asset liquidity calculated for three-digit SIC industries (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, and TotM&A,) and a set of control variables. All 
specifications are pooled (panel) OLS regressions with three-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard 
errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry (except columns (3) and (4) which have no industry fixed effects). Columns (1)-(2) split 
the sample into low and high market-to-book value of assets ratios (V/A) based on whether the distance of a firm’s V/A from the 
industry median is in the bottom or top tercile of the annual distribution across all firms, respectively. Columns (3)-(4) split the 
sample into firms in three-digit SIC industries experiencing an economic downturn and firms in industries that are not experiencing a 
downturn, respectively. The following measures of asset liquidity are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one: 
NoPotBuy is the number of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings; MNLPotBuy is minus the average book 
leverage net of cash holdings of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry, averaged over the past five years; and TotM&A is the value 
of all M&A activity in the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher 
values of all three variables are associated with higher asset liquidity. We also include but do not report the coefficients of the 
following control variables defined in Table 1: LogAssets, M/B, DRP, Blev, ROE, VolRoe, FA/TA, R&DExp, LogAge, DivPay, SalGrow, 
LogInvPrice, and RetPM. The estimates of the intercept, the year fixed effects, and the industry fixed effects are also omitted. The 
absolute values of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Low V/A  High V/A  Industry Downturn  Non Industry Downturn 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Panel A: The measure of asset liquidity is NoPotBuy 
 
        
NoPotBuy -0.015**  -0.012*** -0.013*  -0.017*** 
 (2.43)  (2.76)  (1.79)  (4.90) 
        
Includes all control variables and year dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3 
SIC3 Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
        
Observations 10915  11250  860  32192 
R-squared 0.57  0.54  0.32  0.35 
        
        
Panel B: The measure of asset liquidity is MNLPotBuy 
 
        
MNLPotBuy -0.013***  -0.009** -0.034***  -0.019*** 
 (5.89)  (4.82)  (5.77)  (6.06) 
        
Includes all control variables and year dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3 
SIC3 Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
        
Observations 11158  11501  868  32920 
R-squared 0.58  0.54  0.38  0.36 
        
       
Panel C: The measure of asset liquidity is TotM&A 
 
        
TotM&A -0.007***  -0.004**  -0.024***  -0.012*** 
 (3.04)  (2.01)  (4.78)  (5.23) 
        
Includes all control variables and year dummies; standard errors are clustered by SIC3 
SIC3 Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
        
Observations 11158  11501  868  32920 
R-squared 0.57  0.54  0.39  0.33 
         
 
Table 9   
Asset Liquidity and the Implied Cost of Capital: Controlling for Industry Valuation  
       
The table reports the results from regressions of the implied cost of capital (ICC) on the three alternative standardized measures of 
asset liquidity calculated for three-digit SIC industries (NoPotBuy,  MNLPotBuy, and TotM&A), measures of industry valuation 
(LogIndMBE) or miss-valuation (IndRelVal) also defined for three-digit SIC industries, and a set of control variables. In columns (1) 
and (3) we report an OLS purely cross-sectional regression using the time-series averages of the variables over the sample period for 
each firm, with standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. In columns (2) and (4) we report a pooled (panel) OLS 
regression with three-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. 
The following measures of asset liquidity are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one: NoPotBuy is the number 
of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings; MNLPotBuy is minus the average book leverage net of cash 
holdings of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry, averaged over the past five years; and TotM&A is the value of all M&A activity 
in the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher values of all three 
variables are associated with higher asset liquidity. LogIndMBE is the logarithm of the mean market-to-book equity ratio in the firm’s 
industry and IndRelVal is the industry’s relative valuation, computed as the difference between the industry market-to-book equity 
ratio and its predicted value based on the benchmark Pastor and Veronesi (2003) specification. We also include but do not report the 
coefficients of the following control variables defined in Table 1: LogAssets, M/B, DRP, Blev, ROE, VolRoe, FA/TA, R&DExp, 
LogAge, DivPay, SalGrow, LogInvPrice, and RetPM. The estimates of the intercept, the year fixed effects, and the industry fixed effects 
are also omitted. The absolute values of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
All Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes 
SIC3 Dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Estimation Cross-Sectional  Panel Cross-Sectional  Panel 
Clustering by SIC3  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
        
Panel A: The measure of asset liquidity is NoPotBuy 
 
        
NoPotBuy -0.014***  -0.015*** -0.018***  -0.015*** 
 (4.51)  (2.98)  (5.69)  (3.00) 
LogIndMBE -0.024***  0.002     
 (5.15)  (1.31)     
IndRelVal     0.006  -0.004 
     (1.19)  (1.36) 
        
        
Panel B: The measure of asset liquidity is MNLPotBuy 
 
        
MNLPotBuy -0.013***  -0.011*** -0.019***  -0.011*** 
 (5.78)  (6.38)  (7.30)  (6.70) 
LogIndMBE -0.025***  0.003     
 (6.39)  (1.51)     
IndRelVal     0.016**  -0.001 
     (2.42)  (0.41) 
        
       
Panel C: The measure of asset liquidity is TotM&A 
 
        
TotM&A -0.011***  -0.005***  -0.014***  -0.005*** 
 (8.81)  (2.62)  (9.62)  (2.65) 
LogIndMBE -0.031***  0.002     
 (9.45)  (1.17)     
IndRelVal     0.004  -0.003 
     (0.54)  (0.96) 
         
 
Table 10   
Asset Liquidity and the Implied Cost of Capital: Industry-Level Tests 
       
The table reports the results from industry-level regressions of the implied cost of capital (ICC) on the three alternative standardized 
measures of asset liquidity calculated for three-digit SIC industries (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, and TotM&A,) and a set of control variables. 
For this purpose, all firm-level variables are converted into three-digit SIC industry medians for each year. In columns (1), (3), and (5) we 
report an OLS purely cross-sectional industry-level regression using the time-series averages of the variables over the sample period for 
each industry, with standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. In columns (2), (4), and (6) we report a pooled (panel) industry-
level OLS regression with three-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC 
industry. The following measures of asset liquidity are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one: NoPotBuy is the 
number of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings; MNLPotBuy is minus the average book leverage net of cash 
holdings of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry, averaged over the past five years; and TotM&A is the value of all M&A activity in 
the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher values of all three variables are 
associated with higher asset liquidity. We also include but do not report the coefficients of the following control variables defined in Table 
1: LogAssets, M/B, DRP, Blev, ROE, VolRoe, FA/TA, R&DExp, LogAge, DivPay, SalGrow, LogInvPrice, and RetPM. The estimates of the 
intercept, the year fixed effects, and the industry fixed effects are also omitted. The absolute values of the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
NoPotBuy -0.012**  -0.015**         
 (2.27)  (2.33)         
MNLPotBuy     -0.016***  -0.013***    
     (3.24)  (5.78)    
TotM&A       -0.011**  -0.003* 
       (2.47)  (1.81) 
        
All Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Dummies  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
SIC3  Dummies  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Estimation  Cross-Sectional Panel Cross-Sectional Panel Cross-Sectional Panel 
Clustering  by  SIC3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations  303 4631 304 4793 304 4793 
R-squared 0.59  0.86  0.58 0.85 0.58 0.85 






Asset Liquidity and Unlevered Implied Cost of Capital 
       
The table reports the results from regressions of the unlevered implied cost of capital (UNLICC) on the three alternative 
standardized measures of asset liquidity calculated for three-digit SIC industries (NoPotBuy, MNLPotBuy, and TotM&A) and a set 
of control variables. In columns (1), (3), and (5) we report an OLS purely cross-sectional regression using the time-series averages 
of the variables over the sample period for each firm, with standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. In columns (2), 
(4), and (6) we report a pooled (panel) OLS regression with three-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, and 
standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC industry. The following measures of asset liquidity are standardized to have mean 
zero and standard deviation of one: NoPotBuy is the number of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry that have debt ratings; 
MNLPotBuy is minus the average book leverage net of cash holdings of rival firms in the three-digit SIC industry, averaged over 
the past five years; and TotM&A is the value of all M&A activity in the industry scaled by the book value of the assets in the 
industry, averaged over the past five years. Higher values of all three variables are associated with higher asset liquidity. We also 
include but do not report the coefficients of the following control variables defined in Table 1: LogAssets, M/B, DRP, ROE, 
VolRoe, FA/TA, R&DExp, LogAge, DivPay, SalGrow, LogInvPrice, and RetPM. The estimates of the intercept, the year fixed 
effects, and the industry fixed effects are also omitted. The absolute values of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses below 
each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
NoPotBuy -0.015***  -0.012**      
 (4.33)  (2.49)         
MNLPotBuy     -0.016***  -0.009***    
     (7.35)  (6.29)    
TotM&A       -0.013***  -0.004** 
       (8.52)  (2.25) 
        
All Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Dummies  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
SIC3  Dummies  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Estimation  Cross-Sectional Panel Cross-Sectional Panel Cross-Sectional Panel 
Clustering  by  SIC3  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations  6180 33052 6260 33788 6260 33788 
R-squared 0.36  0.56  0.36 0.57 0.34 0.57 
        
 
 